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"A ZONING ORDINANCE IS NO BETTER THAN
ITS ADMINISTRATION" A PLATITUDE PROVED
The Practicesand Proceduresof Chicago'sZoning Board
of Appeals
By RICHARD L. WEXLER*
INTRODUCTION

The decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,'
holding that it was within the police power of the states to reasonably regulate land utilization through zoning, encouraged
municipalities to "short-term plan" their cities for optimum land
use development through the creation of homogeneous and often
exclusive land use districts. In the forty-one years following
this landmark decision, the great majority of American cities
have enacted some form of zoning ordinance under the express
authority of state enabling legislation. Generally these enabling
acts allow the municipal legislative body to divide the available
land into districts according to use classifications and to regulate
the land use within each district - the regulations to be uniform
for each district-class.2 Thus "Euclidian zoning" in theory would
demand a rigid symmetry; homogeneous uses allowed within
each district-class to the exclusion of all "non-conforming" uses.3
However, since the early Thirties, when most zoning ordinances
went into effect, our cities have undergone dramatic physical
changes: changes in population mobility affecting residential
uses, changes in transportation needs, changes so massive as
to dictate flexibility in land-use controls. Although originally
adopted as a device for avoiding unconstitutional rigidity in
zoning ordinances,4 the variation, or variance, has been used ever
more frequently to obtain this inner-system flexibility. Yet,
in Chicago, and in other cities, the variations and the adminis* Instructor, The John Marshall Law School, member of the firm of Wexler & Kane, Chicago, Ill. During the period of preparation of this paper, the
author served as Assistant Director of the Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council of Chicago. The author wishes to thank Mr. Harry Stinespring
of the student staff of The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure
for his assistance in the preparation of this paper.
1 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2Bair & Bartley, Model Zoning Ordinance, I3 (American Society of
Planning Officials, 1960).
a Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case
Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. L. J. 273, 340 (1962).
4 Rathkopf & Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 37-4 (3rd ed.
1960).
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trative procedures for their implementation have reached a point
of abuse that endangers the very system they were designed to
protect.
Regardless of the degree of care and study applied in the
preparation of the zoning ordinance, it will have little effect and
little value unless it is enforced. A zoning ordinance, and, thus,
the legal land use pattern of a city as large and as complex as
Chicago, can be destroyed by laxity or indifference at any one
of three levels: (1) by the zoning enforcement officer in executing his responsibilities; (2) on the part of the administrative
appeal body in granting variations; and, (3) on the part of the
city council in amending the ordinance at the behest of individual
property owners. When any of these failures occur, public confidence in zoning is shaken, violators are encouraged, and the
securing of needed judicial support for the ordinance is rendered
more difficult. An analysis of existing variation practices and
procedures of the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals 5 will reveal
the problems created by present administrative practices.
VARIATIONS: THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE IN CHICAGO

When the courts first upheld the constitutionality of zoning
ordinances, the validity was based on the police power of the
state to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the
community.6 While Chicago's first zoning ordinance met these
basic requirements, the 1923 city legislation failed to make adequate provision for the control of variations. Subsequently the
City land use pattern was abused through the wholesale approval
of variations. From 1923 through 1927, almost 60% of all petitions for variations appealed to the Zoning Board were granted.'
5The Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals hears petitions on two types of
exceptions to the zoning ordinance: variation and special use. The latter
presents a lesser problem to the Board as the "special uses" for each districtclass are expressly provided in the ordinance with appropriate standards for
their implementation by the Board. The variation exception allows the
Board broader discretion. While the courts frequently fail to distinguish
the two, the differences are significant as different standards apply to each
- differences created by the state and municipal legislation. In Rosenfeld
v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Chicago, 19 Ill.
App. 2d 447, 450; 154 N.E. 2d,
323, 325 (1958) the Court explained that the special use differs from the
variation in that:
"[I]t is a permission by the Board to an owner to use his property in a

manner contrary to the ordinance provided that the intended use is one
of those specifically listed in the ordinance and provided that the public
convenience will be served by the use, while a variance is a grant of relief
to an owner from the literal requirements of the ordinance where literal
enforcement would cause him undue hardship."
6 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); City of
Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
Between 1923 and 1937 there were 4,124 appeals on variations, of which

2,379 or 57.7% were granted by the Board of Appeals. Planningand Zoning
Administration in Chicago (Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council of

Chicago 1938) p. 17.
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1942 saw Chicago make its first major revision of the original
ordinance, but, unrelated to any comprehensive plan of City development, it too became subject to innumerable variations. Beginning in 1952, the City Council through its Committee on
Buildings and Zoning undertook a comprehensive revision and,
after five years of study and analysis, the Comprehensive Amendment to the Chicago Zoning Ordinance was enacted. 8
The Illinois Revised Statutes, in enabling municipalities to
adopt zoning ordinances, state the objectives of zoning:
"To the end that adequate light, pure air, and safety from fire and
other dangers may be secured, that the taxable value of land and
buildings throughout the municipality may be conserved, that congestion in the public streets may be lessened or avoided .

.

. and

that the public health, safety, comfort, morals, and welfare may
otherwise be promoted .

.

The 1957 Comprehensive Amendment to the Chicago ordinance stated a more detailed basis for the use of the police power
to zone:
"(1) To promote and to protect the public health, safety, morals,
comfort, convenience, and the general welfare of the people; ...
(3) To protect the character and maintain the stability of residential, business, commercial, and manufacturing areas within the
City, and to promote the orderly and beneficial development of such
areas; ...

(8) To prohibit uses, buildings or structures which are

incompatible with the character of development or the permitted
uses within specified zoning districts; (9) To prevent such additions to, and alterations or remodeling of existing buildings or
structures as would comply with the restrictions and limitations
imposed hereunder; ...

(14) To provide for the gradual elimina-

tion of those uses of land, buildings, and structures which do not
conform with the standards of the district in which they are respectively located... .

The State Zoning Enabling Act further provides the methodology
for obtaining variations from the strict letter of the ordinance
and the general framework for establishing Zoning Boards of
Appeal." Here, again, the Chicago Zoning Ordinance follows the
State mandate. 1 2 While the 1957 Comprehensive Amendment to
the Chicago Zoning Ordinance was never expected to be a panacea,' changes in the administration of the ordinance were key
features.
The stated rationale in both State and Chicago zoning legislation is the prohibition and elimination of any use of property
contrary to the ordinance. Thus, at the heart of the legislation
8 Passed by Chicago City Council, May'29, 1957.
9ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24, § 11-13-1 (1965).
'o CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 194A, §1, Art. II (1966).
" ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24, §§11-13-3 to 11-13-12 (1965).
12 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, MUNICIPAL CODE,.ch. 194A, §1, Art. II (1966).
Is For a full discussion of the changes made and the expectations caused
by the passage of the 1957 Amendment, see Babcock, The New Chicago Zoning Ordinance, 52 Nw. U. L. REV. 174 (1957).
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is the premise that variations from the ordinance only be permitted in rare situations - in those instances of the extreme
need. The 1957 Comprehensive Amendment completely eliminated the use variation from the Board's powers and established
specific limitations to control the type and extent of non-use
Variations to be granted by the Board. In addition, to prevent
the wholesale approval of variations, the Amendment set up
standards for the granting of variations to guide the Board of
Appeals in its decisions.
In the first four years of operation under these new and
stricter guidelines, the Board of Appeals granted 466 variations
and denied only ,23 - or, 95% of all petitions were granted. 4
Over an eight-month span of observation in 1965, of 269 decided
petitions, variations were granted in 253 cases - a total of 94%
granted petitions. 15 During this 1965 period, in which the Board
met twenty-five times to decide petitions seeking a variation from
one of the bulk, yard or parking requirements of the ordinance,
the petitioners' success record was 97% .16 These grants of variations are constantly accompanied by findings of "practical difficulties or particular hardship in the way of carrying out the
strict letter" 7 of the ordinance. Thus, tie liberal provisions added
in the 1957 Amendment for the amortization of non-conforming
property in order to reduce the number of variations granted was
of little effect.
"The 1957 Comprehensive Amendment goes on the theory that the
danger spots in zoning are non-conforming uses. Under the old
practice they were frozen, and could not expand; therefore, they
were believed to be doomed to elimination. Experience has shown
that, to the contrary, non-conforming uses thrive on their own monopolitic position or that they serve as comfortable excuses for the
intrusion of other non-conforming uses which in turn lead to a
breakdown of the entire zoning program. It is believed necessary,
therefore, to provide for their elimination fwithout the costly process of condemnation but after a period of grace in which they
would enjoy a virtual monopoly and could 'amortize" their investment."18
The Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals, from the statistics compiled, now hears more appeals and grants proportionately more
variations than ever before.
The majority of these buildings and land uses which would
be considered "non-donforming" under the ordinance are located
in the City's deteriorating neighborhoods: neighborhoods which
14 Davies, The Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals: A Three Month Study
(unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Pittsburghi 1962).
.
.
15 Studies bi the author foi the Metropolitan': Hoising and Planning
Council of Chicago in conjunction with an examination of the effectiveness of
the administrative provisions under the 1957 Comprehensive Amendments.
16 Id.
17 ILL.. REV. STAT., ch. 24, §11-13-4
(1965).
Is Babcock, supra note 13 at 191.
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are the concern of the City of Chicago's basic policy of redevelopment, conservation and rehabilitation. 71% of the petitions
granted by the Board of Appeals between May and December,
1965, affected properties located in community areas with the
highest percentage of dilapidated and deteriorating structure
condition."' This City policy and that of the Board of Appeals
passed each other like ships in the night.
PROCEDURES: CHICAGO'S ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS

The hearing.
The Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals has the power, within
the boundaries set by its enabling legislation, to promulgate its
own rules of procedure for its hearings. While the Board often
makes verbal reference to its "rules,'

20

few are privy to any

written document containing the Board's operating rules. While
there are some definitive standards prescribed by the statutes
and the courts, the latter have yet to state all of the essentials for
fair and impartial administrative hearings by zoning boards of
appeal.2 1 This lack of uniformity has caused at least one commentator on the problem to note that: "There is, in short,
nothing approaching a continuity of administrative practice or
standards in the field of zoning law as it is carried on in Illinois. ' 21 2 It is nonetheless possible to set out some basic standards which should be met to insure a fair and impartial hearing
19 The author plotted on an outline map of Chicago the 253 granted
variations and then superimposed a map of Chicago's defined Community
areas. Using structure data from the Local Community Fact Book - Chicago MetropolitanArea, 1960 (Kitagawa & Taeuber, University of Chicago),
the 71% figure was reached. As this percentage was based solely on Census
information and not on professional structural surveys, it represents a minimum figure only.
Merely to indicate that the Board's policy on variations is continuous,
the results of hearings on the thirty-three (33) petitions decided at the January 24, 1967, and February 14 and 21, 1967, hearings were: thirty-two petitions for variation granted and one denied of thirty-three decided (98%).
Records,
Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals (1967).
20
See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, January 12, 1967, wherein John Iglewski,
Chief Zoning Examiner of the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals, cited the
"procedural rules by which the board has operated for thirty years" as requiring only three members for a quorum.
21 "In general, administrative agencies are not bound by the technical
common law rules of evidence, but they must observe the basic rules of fairness as to parties appearing before them." Dal Maso v. Board of County
Commissioners, 238 Md. 333, 209 A. 2d 62, 64 (1965).
"Under the general law the city council or village board of trustees
shall determine its own rules of procedure in the matter of adoption of ordinances, subject to the statutory requirements therein referred to." The
People v. Strohm, 285 Ill. 580, 585; 121 N.E. 223, 225 (1918).
22 "One local board may insist upon a transcribed record of proceedings,
another may be content with a pro forma record. Board A may swear all
witnesses; Board B may base its findings upon unsworn testimony . . . "
Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in Illinois, 26 U.
CHi. L. REv., 509, n.102 (1959).
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by zoning boards - standards with which to measure the actions
of Chicago's Board of Appeals.
The zoning appeal procedure is initiated with the filing of an
application for a variation to be presented before the Board with
an accompanying statement of the nature of the variation requested. The applicant must also submit a list of property owners within 250 feet of the proposed variation to satisfy statutory
notice requirements. 23 In addition to the notice to these immediate property owners, a published notice is required to be printed
at least once. 24 Thus, objectors are invited to be present and
testify at the Zoning Board of Appeals' hearing, yet they may
have no standing to initiate any further proceedings. 25
The courts have granted the zoning boards great freedom in
the use of testimony offered, 2 1 and only rarely has there been any
criticism voiced of the board's exclusion of some testimony and
the admission of other. Only in extreme or salient cases of
abuse have the courts responded with any criticism. In Rosenfeld v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Chicago,27 the Board members
opened the proceedings on a proposed variation by stating: "We
know all about this lot,"2

and later refused to hear plaintiff's

expert witness on the propriety of the variation because: "We
remember him.

' 29

The court found this conduct to be highly

prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner. With a member of
the City of Chicago's Department of Law sitting as an adviser
to the Board at its hearings, this writer has himself observed
the Chicago Board of Appeals admit hearsay testimony on one
petition while denying the petitioner next to come before them
the opportunity to offer an almost identical hearsay statement.
Testimony offered as to direct observations of the property in
question is frequently excluded by the Board as "hearsay."80
Ex parte contacts -

the "hidden" problem.

While the courts and statutes require a full administrative
proceeding, a growing problem is one of ex parte contacts. Increasing concern has manifested itself in recent years on ex
23

ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 24,

24

Id.

§ 11-13-7 (1965).

See text at notes 55-61, infra.
The People v. Strohm, 285 Ill. 580, 121 N.E. 223 (1918); Flick v.
Gately, 328 Ill. App. 81, 65 N.E. 2d 137 (1946). Cf. Village of Justice v.
Jamieson, 7 Ill.
App. 2d 113, 129 N.E. 2d 269 (1955).
27 19 Ill.
App. 2d 447, 154 N.E. 2d 323 (1958).
28 Id. at 452, 154 N.E. 2d at 326.
25

26

29Id.
20

Direct observations of the author over the study period.
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parte contacts at the federal level3 1 - a concern that is not evident with respect to state and local administrative agencies.
Several reasons can be suggested as to why this problem has
failed to date to come before our state courts in considering the
problems of zoning administration. First, the majority of cases
that come before zoning boards are uncontested, and, when contested many of the objectors find themselves with no standing
later in the courts. The nature of the application for a variation
is such that the matter, while vitally affecting the interests of
the City's overall planning and policies, rarely has an effect on
the immediate interests of other private individuals. Also, the
very nature of ex parte contacts in the context of the informal
procedures followed by zoning boards of appeal makes them extremely difficult to uncover, and once detected, presents the most
insurmountable problems of proof. For these reasons, many ex
parte contacts go unnoticed. However, at the federal level, secret communications to a hearing officer by friends to whom he
felt obligated concerning matters before the Federal Communications Commission,32 letters and private conversations by applicants to board members after the record on the proceedings
had been closed,13 have all been vigorously condemned as ex
paite contacts violative of federal due process of law. This increasing concern with ex parte contacts at the federal level extends to the zoning area as well as to other federal regulatory
agencies. In Jarrott V. Scrivener,4 the facts revealed that the
District of Columbia Zoning Board of Appeals, after conducting
two hearings on the matter of permitting the Soviet Embassy
a variation for purpose of establishing a Chancery in a residential district of Washington, approved the petition. Neighboring
home owners and civic organizations, contesting the grant of
the variation, appealed to the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia to set aside the Board's decision, alleging that
they were denied a fair and impartial hearing when "high ranking federal officials" had contacted the Board membership and
31 Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-elect (1960).
For a full discussion of the Federal response to the ex parte contact problem,
See Peck, Regulation and Control of Ex Parte Communications with Administrative Agencies, 76 HNARv. L. REV. 233 (1962).
32 W.K.A.T. Inc. v. FCC, 258 F. 2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
An F.C.C.
Commissioner participating in a pending decision was contacted on behalf of
applicants for a television construction permit. The subsequent grant of the
permit was voided on appeal because the ex parte contacts violated due
process, and further because of violations of "judicial ethics."
33 Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 358 U.S. 49

(1958).

An applicant for a television construction permit wrote letters to

and made gifts to all F.C.C. Commissioners months after the deadline for the
entry of arguments and comments into the record. The Commissioners' sub-

sequent decision in the applicant's favor, not supported by the record, was
struck down.
84 225 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1964).
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had made it known that a favorable decision would be "in the
national interest." These ex parte contacts were not written into
the record of the Board's proceeding. The Court held the decision of the Zoning Board violative of due process and ordered
that a new Board be constituted to rehear the petition. Jarrott
marks the first time a zoning board of appeal's decision has been
reviewed on the due process question raised by ex parte contacts3 5
In Chicago the "interest of the Ward" or "the best interest
of the City" is the criterion rather than "the national interest,"
but the results are the same. Petitioners commonly solicit their
aldermen to appeal to the Board and the question of "how your
alderman feels about the variation" is one frequently asked of
petitioners by the Zoning Board itself,36 although cross-examination of the alderman would not be possible and no evidence of
the contact would appear in the record. The appropriate statutory safeguards require a public hearing. The Illinois courts
have established that a public hearing is effectively denied when
an administrative agency denies the right to examine and crossexamine a witness:
"An administrative tribunal or agency cannot rely upon its information for support of its findings, but an order must be based upon
evidence produced in the hearing at which an opportunity is given

to all interested parties to offer evidence and cross-examine witnesses.37",

"Executive Sessions": the "hidden" hearing.
Chicago's Zoning Board of Appeals has a statutorily declared
membership of five88 and "the concurring vote of 4 members of
the board is necessary . . .to decide in favor of the applicant
85 For a further analysis of Ja'rrott,see note 12, U.C.L.A. L. REV. 969
(1965).
86 "There is heavy political pressure behind some of these zoning deals,
many bordering on conflicts of interest." Chicago Daily News, October 28,
1965.
"Zoning in Chicago is so shot with exceptions won by political corruption
that on occasion city lawyers have hesitated to appeal adverse rulings of the
lower courts for fear the Supreme Court would say that the whole zoning
code . ... is unconstitutional."

Chicago Tribune, February 19, 1954.

The author observed during the study period in 1965 that in every contested matter before the Board, the feelings of the alderman were solicited
by the Board: the alderman was either present, sent one of his staff or the
parties were urged by the Board to contact their alderman.
'7 Curtis v. State Police Merit Board, 349 Ill. App. 448, 457; 111 N.E.
2d 159, 163 (1953). See also Braden v. Much, 403 IIl. 507, 87 N.E. 2d 620
(1949) wherein the Court stated:
"We have previously defined the words 'public hearing' before any tribunal or body, by the accepted definitions of lexicographers and courts, to
mean the right to appear and ...examine the witnesses whose testimony

at 513, 87 N.E. 2d at 623.
is presented by opposing parties.". .Id.
It should be noted that the Board does permit cross-examination of the witnesses present. This right is summarily denied by the City Council Committee on Buildings and Zoning as their "rules don't permit it."
HILL. REv. STAT., ch. 24, §11-13-3(A) (1965).
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any matter upon which it is required to ... affect any variation
in the ordinance ....," The practice of the Board is to have

three or four members take testimony and examine witnesses
at the officially designated public hearing for which notice has
been given. When the proponents and opponents have finished,
the members present announce that the petition will be "taken
under advisement." An "executive session" of the Board is then
convened at a later date, from which the public is barred, 4 g after
which a resolution issues from the Board containing its "findings" and decision, signed by the requisite four endorsing members.41 Although this precise question has not yet been decided
by the Illinois courts, the Zoning Enabling Act would suggest
that four members of the Board must be present as a quorum
necessary to convene the public hearing on variations. In McAlpine V. Garfield Water Commission,42 the New Jersey Supreme
Court was faced with the same problem of statutory construction that would face our Illinois courts; an employee of the City
of Garfield's Water Commission was fired after a public hearing
attended by less than the requisite number of members of the
Water Commission - although all were present at the "executive
session."
"Only one question is presented on this appeal. Where the dismissal of an employee is based upon a hearing conducted by the
members of a municipal commission, and one of the members did
not hear all of the evidence adduced, is the action of the commission vitiated by the participation of43 such a member in the final
deliberations and vote of dismissal?"

The Court answered the question presented and overturned the
commission ruling:
"Since it is not feasible to evaluate the personal influence which may
be exerted by any one member, we believe it necessarily follows
that fairness and impartiality can only be assured when the members participating in the deliberations and decision of the board or
commission, following a hearing ...have had an equal opportunity
to hear and evaluate all of the evidence presented at the hearing.
...'The rule is fundamental that a person who has not heard the
testimony in a given case occupies 44' no legal status as arbiter or
judge to adjudicate upon the cause'. "
RFy.

ch. 24,§11-13-3(E)

(1965).

39

ILL.

40

The author attempted, unsuccessfully, to obtain dates, times and

STAT.,

places of the "executive sessions" from the staff of the Zoning Board of
Appeals.
41 Earl S. McMahon, member of the Board, died July 19, 1966. No replacement has been appointed at the time of this writing. Another member
had failed to attend a public hearing for six months due to illness; however,
his vote always appeared, duly inscribed on the Board's resolutions. This
latter member was replaced in 1967.
42 135 N.J.L. 497, 52 A. 2d 759 (1947) ; see also Eisberg v. Cliffside Park,
92 N.J.L. 321, 105 A. 2d 716 (1919).
43 McAlpine v. Garfield Water Commission, 135 N.J.L. 497, 62 A. 2d
759, 760 (1947).
44 Id. 52 A. 2d at 761.
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Meanwhile, the official position of the Chicago Zoning Board of
Appeals continues to be that a quorum of four or more is not
essential to the hearing.4 5 Moreover, unlike the Chicago School
Board and other local agencies, the Zoning Board of Appeals
employs no court reporter to transcribe the public hearings.
The "executive session" procedure used by the Board should
first be exmained in light of its enabling legislation providing
that "All meetings of the Board shall be open to the public. ' 46
Though the language therein is clear, even more so is the Illinois
Public Meeting Act of 1965.47 This Act expressly states:
"It is the public policy of this State that the public commissions,
committees, boards, and councils and other public agencies in this
State exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business. It is the
openly and that their
intent of this Act that their actions be taken
'4 s
official deliberations be conducted openly."
This untested statute, provides for the extraordinary remedy of
a writ of mandamus to force public bodies in Illinois to open their
meetings; however, the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals, as
well as other agencies and boards,' 9 continues its official deliberations in the seclusion of "executive session."
Findings of facts.
The Illinois Zoning Enabling Act requires that every variation by boards of appeal "shall be accompanied by findings of
facts specifying the reason or reasons for making the variation." 50
"The diversity among boards with respect to the quantum of the
'findings of fact' which they deem a prerequisite to a grant of
relief is notorious. In some municipalities the findings are precise
and deal with the specific character of the property and its surroundings. Many boards, however, are content to parrot the conclusions set out in the enabling act that there exists 'practical
difficulty or particular hardship'." 51
The Chicago Board consistently restates the statutory conclusions
without specifying any factual basis for granting the variation
4z The Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals, in defending a member's
absence in a controversial matter on which he later voted, stated: "As

long as testimony of witnesses is recorded, three members or even one
member can conduct a legal hearing. Testimony in this case was recorded and turned over to the absent member .. . who read it and reached
an affirmative decision." Chicago Tribune, January 12, 1967.
46 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24, §11-13-3(C) (1965).
47 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 102, §41

(1965).

48 Id.
49 See Chicago's American, Editorial "Those 'Public' Meetings," March
16, 1966.
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24, §11-13-11 (1965).
51 Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration, supra note
50

22, n. 102 (1959).
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requested.5 2 In Lindburg v. Zoning Board of Appeals,53 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the statutory recital still employed
by the Chicago Board. The Court in Lindburg admonished the
Springfield Zoning Board of Appeals, stating: "The requirement
of the statute is not met by parroting the highly generalized
statutory phrases, 'practical difficulties' and 'particular hardship'.1'1 While other zoning boards in Illinois and elsewhere 5
have to defend their records in light of Lindburg and similar decisions, the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals has not. 6
The procedures required to be followed by the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals would seemingly be well defined by statute,
ordinance and court decision. The fact that these procedural
safeguards can be ignored so often would indicate that their
definition is not clear enough. That the built-in procedural safeguards can be overlooked with such consistency endangers the
totality of substantive provisions of the ordinance.
BEYOND THE BOARD:

PROBLEMS ON APPEAL

When an appeal is taken from the decision of the Zoning
Board of Appeals, the record is sent to the Circuit Court as provided in the Illinois Administrative Review Act.5 7 The record
of the Board presents the Court with the following problems on
review: statutory conclusions were stated rather than pure "findings of facts;" a decision rendered in closed "executive session"
52 The following resolution typifies the Board's "findings of facts":
"WHEREAS, the Board of Appeals, having fully heard the testimony
and arguments of the parties and being fully advised in the premises
finds that in this case the proposed use is to be located in an R3 General
Residence District; that there is unnecessary hardship in the way of
carrying out the strict letter of the Zoning Ordinance; that the property
in question cannot yield a reasonable return nor can it be put to reasonable use if permitted to be used only under the conditions allowed by the
regulations in that zone; that the plight of the owner is due to unique
circumstances; that the variation, if granted, will not alter the essential
character of the locality... "
This resolution is part of the "record" in petition #402-65-Z (July 20, 1965),
and is typical of the "findings of facts" in all resolutions reviewed.
5 8 Ill. 2d 254, 133 N.E. 2d 266 (1956); But see also Rosenfeld v.
Zoning Board of Appeals, 19 Ill. App. 2d 447, 154 N.E. 2d 323 (1958).
548 Ill. 2d 254, 256; 133 N.E. 2d 266, 268 (1956).
55 Similar problems have been ascertained in other states. For example,
in Pennsylvania the courts' mandate that "findings of facts" be made part of
the record by the zoning board is "continually disregarded." Craig, Pennsylvania Building and Zoning Laws - An Allegheny County Appraisal,p. 249,
(University of Pittsburg 1961). See also, Faught, Zoning Under Changing Conditions in Pennsylvania, 10 U. PITT. L. REV. 310, 311 (1949).
In Illinois, for example, the Lindburg decision required a re-examination
of the City of Elmhurst zoning ordinance in Kaczarewski v. Elmhurst-Chicago 56Stone Co., 10 Ill. 2d 582, 141 N.E. 2d 14 (1957).
Lindburg was apparently ignored when the Cook County Circuit Court
approved the statutory recital by the Zoning Board of Appeals as valid
"findings of facts" in Wolbach v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 65 L. 287,
,Ill. App. 2d ---(1967).
57 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, §§264-279 (1965).
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by the Board when less than a quorum was present when testimony was offered at the public hearing; a decision which failed
to state the weight given admitted hearsay testimony and failed
to state what testimony was excluded and why. The court then
is to base its decision upon this record, deeming it to be "prima
facie true and correct." 58 The burden of proof, notwithstanding
the faults in the record, is on the "appellant," whomever he may
be, and not on the Board of Appeals. 59
The objectors at the public hearing before the Board are
free to voice their opposition. Thus, community organizations
chartered to preserve and conserve their neighborhoods can
express the specific area's concern to the Board. Yet in any
appeal from Board to court, these same objectors are deemed to
lack the requisite standing to be party plaintiffs, and are recognized only as witnesses at the original proceeding. In 222 E.
Chestnut Street Corp. v. Board of Appeals of City of Chicago8 0
the plaintiff appealed the grant of a variation by the Chicago
Board of Appeals. He complained to the Court that fumes, noise
and dust would be created if a parking lot were permitted to be
erected across from his apartment, building. The Court stated
that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue as " .... the right to maintain a suit in such cases depends upon whether the zoning inflicts
a special or peculiar injury upon the party bringing the suit"'
as opposed to the public generally. Thus, the same standing is
required to appeal an administrative decision of the Zoning Board
as is demanded by the courts to bring a tort action for private
nuisance. In fact, nuisance law has had a strong influence on the
development of zoning practice. The law of nuisance, as it applies to land use, encompasses the situation in which harmful
acts, undertaken by one landowner on his land, injure the land
of an adjoining landowner.62 This gives rise to a bill in equity
for an injunction by the injured landowner. However, nuisance
and zoning law alike place the burden of proof on the landowner
alleging the objectionable harm, and both require that the harm,
58 Id. at §274.
"Every action to review any final administrative decision shall be heard

and determined by the court with all convenient speed. The hearing and
determination shall extend to all questions of law and of fact presented

by the entire record before the court. No new or additional evidence in
support of or in opposition to any finding, order, determination or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court. The findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact

shall be held to be prima facie true and correct." (Emphasis added.)

59 Dawson v. Board of Appeals, 41 Ill. App. 2d 125, 190 N.E. 2d 123

(1963).
60

14 Ill. 2d 190, 152 N.E. 2d 465 (1958).

61 Id. at 192.
62 For a full discussion of nuisance application to land use problems
see Beuscher & Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases.
1955 Wis. L. REv., 440.
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and therefore the cause of action, be strictly personal to him.
Unless the harm falls in the public nuisance category, the property owner sues to redress injury to his own rights in land, but
not to redress injury to community or area interests.6 3 That
private nuisance doctrine must be invoked for standing in a court
of law when a variation of the ordinance has been granted in
violation of the constitutional and legislative basis for zoning the health, safety and public welfare - remains a basic and historical anachronism. However, it is the law:
"As one may not assume the role of champion of a community to
challenge public officers to meet him in courts of justice to defend
their official acts, . . . so one having only a general interest may not
adopt the part of an advocate of municipal welfare ... to promote
of zoning regulations. ''64

a judicial enforcement or interpretation
The effect of the decisions in this area is to place the total burden
upon zoning boards of appeal to protect the integrity of the ordinance and thereby protect the public health, safety and welfare.
Thus, on appeal, one whose future damages are thought to
be speculative or no different than those suffered by the public
generally has no standing in the courts. Yet, the same variation
which affects him only generally and is, therefore, approved by
the courts, subsequently provides the Board of Appeals with a
"precedent" for granting a later variation which will affect the
very same protestor directly: the Board relying upon the existing
land use approved earlier by it and the court as a basis for the
present variation. The Illinois Supreme Court has noted this
anomaly, stating: "One encroachment brings6 5on another with a
resulting detriment to the whole community.
THE ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS AND THE FUTURE

The City of Chicago's Department of Development and Planning recently published the "Comprehensive Plan of Chicago""6
after years of effort. Ultimately it will devolve upon the Chicago
Zoning Board of Appeals to protect the integrity of this plan, for
upon this body has fallen the task of preserving the purposes of
zoning through proper enforcement of community planning interests. If steps are not taken to improve the actions of the
Board, the City of Chicago can expect its long awaited Comprehensive Plan to meet the fate of its earlier land use plans - a
63 See Mandelker, The Role of
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS, 26, 28 (1965),

Law in the Planning Process, 30 LAw &

for examples of the consequences.

84 Garner v. County of Du Page, 8 Ill. 2d 155, 160; 133 N.E. 2d 303, 305

(1956). Pennsylvania offers a viable alternative allowing "any person aggrieved . . .or any taxpayer . . . " to institute an appeal in the zoning
situation, 53 P.S. 9813, as amended.
65 Skrysak v. Village of Mount Prospect, 13 Ill. 2d 329, 334; 148 N.E. 2d
721, 723 (1968).
68 City of Chicago, The Comprehensive Plan of Chicago, December 1966.
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gradual erosion through the wholesale granting of variations. The
courts have shown a reluctance at interjecting themselves in the
ultimate decision as to whether a variation should or should not
be granted. They see the question as one of purely local concern:
"In the absence of outrageous discrimination the court wants to
avoid the hopeless task of weighing, from briefs and extracts filed
in Springfield, the relative merits of a plea affecting a parcel of
land at a street intersection in Carlinville, South Beloit, Chicago or

Arlington Heights."67
As the courts have set the most minimal of guidelines, the legislature must assume the task of eliminating the hopeless confusion
in the procedure and makeup of zoning boards, not only in Chicago, but throughout the State. The solutions are difficult, often
complex, but they should be explored.
The confidence which early authorities expressed in zoning
administration through a board of appeals was based, at least in
part, upon the assumption that such boards could be and would be
composed of persons with some training and experience in the
matters which would come before them. While the Illinois Courts
in the early years of zoning termed the boards "minor administrative bodies,"68 the present assumption in Illinois is better reflected in the respect accorded decisions of the zoning boards treating them, as in New York, as if they were "an expert body
entrusted by the legislature to enforce the provisions of the Zoning Law."69 This expertise is attributed to zoning boards because
of the actions they should take, not the actions they actually take;
because of their theoretical rather than actual composition. The
failure to require that members of zoning boards of appeal be
trained or experienced in some occupation or discipline related to
the regulation of land use has resulted in boards composed of persons drawn from a variety of occupations.
"Commonly, the business community furnishes a majority of members. A board may include an attorney or a realtor. .. occasionally

a board will include a member who is identifiable as a representative
of organized labor. It is customary for the appointing authority to
from each of the major political parties in the comname members
70
munity."
In Chicago, though requirements for membership are set out by
67 Babcock The New Chicago Zoning Ordinance, 52 Nw. U. L. REV.

174, 176 (1957 .
516. 9 N.E. 2d 232
68 Behnke v. President and Board of Trustees, 366 Ill.
(1937).
69 Chapmald Realty Corp. v. Board of Standards, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 296
82, 76 N.E. 333 (1931).
(1948). See also Welton v. Hamilton, 344 Ill.
Villain or Victim? 13
70 Anderson, The Board of Zoning Appeals SYRACUSE L. REv. 353 (1962).
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ordinance,7 1 the pattern of membership has been, consciously or
unconsciously, to meet the common criteria set out above and to
12
balance the membership of the Board of Appeals -ethnically.
The apparent assumption is that there are but two criteria necessary to adjudge the need for granting or denying petitions for
variations: common sense and some knowledge of the City.
"The unspoken premise is that the board of zoning appeals is a
jury designed to adjust the conflicts between imperfect regulations
and existing property interests, and the essential, -quality of membership 'is a balanced representation 7 of
the principle economic and
3
political interests of the community."
if the Zoning Board of Appeals is ever to lbe an "expert body"
entitled to assume the trust and burdens put upon it by the legislature, and not merely "experts at compromise,' then'the legislature itself, either City or State, must prescribe 'some basic qualifications of membership. As competency is a necessary concommitant to. fair decision-making, qualifications such as length of
residence, vocational experience and pecuniary disinterest should
be stated. Such standards should require that whenever feasible
the Board be in part composed of professional land planners, and
that restrictions against (rather than in favor of) the number of
board members with occupational ties to property or property
interests be employed. A stated set of qualifications could go
far in assuring impartiality and discouraging the influence of
75
ex parte contacts.
The promulgation of an established set of standardized procedures could further assure a more uniform, formalized treatment of zoning variation petitions by the Zoning Board of Appeals. - The Model State Administrative Procedure Acts,76 though
primarily directed to licensing problems, offer noteworthy efforts
toward, the elimination of ad hoc procedures in the zoning area.
Those who prepared one draft of the Act well stated the problem
to be solved:
"The procedures themselves are generally of an ad hoc nature, and
71

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, MUNICIPAL CODE, ch 20 §1 (1966). "a majority of

said members at the time of the appointment shall be members of the Illinois
Society of Architects, the Western Society of Engineers, the Chicago Real
Estate Board, the Cook County Real Estate Board the Building Managers'
Association of Chicago the Building Construction Employers' Association or
the Chicago Building trades Council . .. or shall be a citizen who has outstanding experience in zoning administration." Id.
72 The present membership of the Board has broad appeal: GreekAmerican, Jewish-American, Irish-American and Swedish-American.
7 Anderson, supra,'note 68 at 353.
74 BAKER, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF ZONING 86 (1927).

75 See text at notes 27-33 supra for a full discussion of ex parte contacts.
76 Two such Acts were studied:
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, MODEL

STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 9c UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 179

(1957)i and A State Municipal Administrative Procedure Act, 3 HARVARD

JOURNAL ON LEGISLATION 323 (1966).
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the potential dangers in the delegation of such broad discretion
to county (sic) and municipal agencies are of increasing concern
as the changing character of American towns and cities lessens the
likelihood of social pressure operating to prevent arbitrary action
....The protection of procedural rights ... will only come through
specifically at establishing general procedural
legislation aimed
77
requirements.
If these standardized procedures, once enacted, are constantly
violated by Chicago's Zoning Board, then the time will have come
for Illinois' courts to realize that they are abdicating too great a
responsibility to too unresponsive a body.
If Illinois prefers to limit changes in procedural prerequisites to the zoning area, any proposed amendment to the Illinois
Zoning Enabling Act must provide statutory prerequisites for
the provision of an adequate record by the administrative body.
Absent a record, the courts are entirely unable to exercise any
control over the administrative discretion in deciding any question on appeal pertaining to the variation granted below. With
its present "record" merely restating the statutory conclusions
without findings of facts, the Zoning Board of Appeals has been
able effectively to tie the hands of the courts, and perhaps helps
to explain the courts' obvious reluctance to involve themselves
in zoning administration. The stenographic recording of the
proceedings in Chicago today is provided solely by the petitioners when and if they want a record. The Secretary of the Zoning
Board of Appeals takes down the names of all witnesses, but very
little else.78 Any legislation in this area must provide that the
Board and not the litigant will provide a full and complete stenographic record of all proceedings on the matter in question.
Another important suggestion has been the creation of a
state-wide Zoning Commission that would not only establish uniform procedure throughout the state, but would also provide the
situs for direct appeal from the local Board.7 9 Through this
"super board" device, the courts would be relieved of the burden
of a type of litigation they obviously consider onerous, and men
of the greatest knowledge and competence in the field could be
appointed to review the decision of boards lower down the hier7 A State Municipal Administrative
NAL OF LEGISLATION 323 (1966).

Procedure Act, 3 HARvARD JOUR-

78 The "record" is transcribed by the Secretary in shorthand. Parties,
in controversial matters before the Board, will bring their own stenographers
to the hearing to fill two functions: (1) as a visible "threat" that as the party
is willing to hire a stenographer, he would further be willing to pay the
cost of an appeal of an adverse decision; and, (2) the court on review will
have the benefit of the precise testimony of all parties, including experts,
even if the Board will not. The Secretary's shorthand notations should be
compared with: "The zoning board of appeals shall designate one of its employees to act as its secretary who has experience in zoning matters and who
is qualified to make stenographic reports of the record of all proceedings of
said board .... " CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 20, §6 (1965).
79 Babcock, supra note 22 at 538-39.
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archy. Also, such a commission could alleviate the nuisanceoriented standing requirements now necessary in zoning matters
before the Illinois courts and, thereby, allow community and
civic organizations to "share the burden," so to speak, of protecting the city's land use patterns.
Perhaps, the time has come, after forty-plus years in Chicago watching the substance of zoning ordinances improve without commensurate improvement in the administration thereof,
that the Zoning Board of Appeals be completely dissolved and
replaced with a single, professional "zoning administrator." 80
This method, already underway in San Francisco"' and other
cities, 82 has proved successful in limiting appeals and in placing
greater emphasis on the comprehensive plan-zoning relationship.
The administrator would be an official of Chicago's Department
of Development and Planning in charge of its Zoning Division
rather than tied within the confines of the Department of Buildings. His two basic responsibilities would be: (1) administration and enforcement of the zoning ordinance as a planning function; and, (2) the hearing-deciding of petitions for variations.
A three-man citizen board would then be established to review
the administrator's decisions subject to the same limitations
placed upon the administrator by the ordinance. The discretion
of the administrator would be limited, as the ordinance would
relate variations to the comprehensive planning process, and permit the grant of a variation only after a finding:
1. That strict application of the provisions of the zoning
ordinance would result in practical difficulties or unnecessary
hardships inconsistent with the general purpose and intent of
the ordinance;
2. That there exist exceptional circumstances applicable to
the property involved or to the intended use or development of
the property that do not apply generally to other property in the
same zone or neighborhood;
3. That the grant of a variation will not be materially
detrimental to the public welfare or injurious to the property or
improvements in such zone or neighborhood in which the property is located; and,
80 This is not to be confused with Chicago's "Zoning Administrator"
provided for in the CHICAGO, ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 194A, §§11.2-1 &
11.2-2 (1966). That appointee is solely responsible for the ministerial en-

forcement of the ordinance and several clerical functions.
81 For a full discussion of the San Francisco zoning operation see

Fisher, Land Use Control Through Zoning: The San Francisco Experience,
13 HASTINGS L. J. 322 (1962).
82 Smutz, Is Zoning Wagging the Dog?
NING OFFICIALS, PLANNING 1955, 102 (1956).
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4. That the grant of a variation will not be contrary to
the objectives of the comprehensive plan.83
As the former Zoning Administrator in Los Angeles has
stated:
"Under this system . . . there is definite fixed responsibility and a
better chance of following consistent policies than under the former
system... Zone variances are now made administrative, quasi-judicial matters handled by a full-time administrator, protected by
civil service regulations. The administrator, due to this essential
protection, is thus able to act impartially on the facts and merits
of a case and to maintain consistent policies. Although the procedure for appeal to the board of zoning appeals does not relieve
the administrator of any of his responsibility, it does provide a
means of review and a safety valve that prevents criticism to the
'
effect that the administrator is vested with too much authority. 4
As Chicago now has a Comprehensive Plan this method of preserving its efficacy might be explored.
One long-time observer of zoning administration in Chicago has commented: "Some cities die in cataclysmic disasters.
In the modern world, it's much more likely that they'll die one
8' 5
lot at a time with the zoning officials performing the last rites.
This need not be the case. But the time has come for dramatic
action in the area of zoning administration. Our society is not
so complex that the zoning boards of appeal need continue unchecked.

83 Id.
84

Id. at 105.

85 McMullen,

Zoning Mystery: Mayor Stands Aside, Chicago Daily
News, October 28, 1965.
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